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## CIA PROGRESS REPORT

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Annex 1 (Administration)

Part 2, Section 6

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CBH Rewrite for DD/A Comment/Approval

11 December 1951

Rapid expansion of the agency during the high-pressure period that came with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea brought with it a speed-up that soon penetrated the fiscal offices of CIA.

Until the latter half of 1950, CIA had managed

appropriations had doubled and redoubled since 1948,\*

the agency's over-all bill for FY 1951 did not yet

exceed Favored by an alert as well as a

sympathetic Congress CIA expanded its global services

untroubled by shortages in appropriations or by undue

inquisitiveness on the Hill. And in the spending of

those funds, CIA successfully hurdled the difficulties

that complicate the financing of covert activities over
seas. Thus while the agency was beset by troubles in

some spheres of its operations, it was happily free from

dollar worries and from harassment on the Hill.

This uniquely happy state of affairs could be

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<sup>(\*)</sup> Accuracy to be confirmed by Comptroller.

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attributed to an amicable understanding that had previously been reached on the Hill. While CIA could not be exempted from Congressional purse-string control, the agency was permitted to justify its budget in secret before a few key members of Congress. To conceal that budget and thus protect the activities for which it provided, the appropriations leadership of both Houses reserved to itself the right to withhold the CIA budget from scrutiny by the Congress. This, in turn, required

This is not a good word in this report

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As with Congress, CTA's sensitivity has limited the Bureau of the Budget in its scrutiny of the agency's requests.

But while this limitation has confronted the Bureau with special security problems, it has not exempted CTA from an

annual thorough budget going-over. Each year the agency is Approved For Release 2001/07/28: CIA-RDP78-04718A002700130012-7

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compelled to establish to the satisfaction of the Bureau the cost as well as the need for its programs and funds.

Throughout the fall and winter of 1950, the pace of U. S. intelligence activities quickened. By the early spring of 1951, preliminary estimates disclosed that CIA budget requirements for FY 1952 would vastly exceed those of the previous year. (Meanwhile, the -> I believe this is open fiscal offices of the agency had been expanded to meet the increased load. With reorganization of the agency wording doesn't make good sense. in late 1950, the Comptroller was removed from the chain also, Comptroller ber of command and assigned as staff assistant to the Deputy never been in Director for Administration. Until then, the Comptroller had functioned as part of a vast hierarchy of agency comptables was executing on ) out 1950. officials directly responsible to the Director.

As the speed-up continued, fiscal procedures were adjusted piece by piece to the growing needs of the organization. By the summer of 1951, the agency had so expanded

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fers. Not yet convinced of the desirability of fiscal reorganization, the division continued to perform its tasks by adapting itself readily to them. Although the

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the issue will be left in limbo until the need is more firmly established.

But while the agency's internal fiscal affairs are in good order, CIA is speedily approaching a crisis in

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intelligence were limited to Between

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1948 and 1950, those modest-sized budgets could not only be justified with ease but they could just as easily be

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By 1951, however, trouble was foreshadowed in the prospective budget for FY 1952. As the result of a scurry in covert activities overseas, the CIA budget for that year zoomed to a \_\_\_\_\_\_\* Initial

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estimates for FY 1952 have since accented the problem.

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(\*\*) Taken out of a hat for illustrative use only.

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<sup>(\*)</sup> To be verified.
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In short, a agency has become a

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agency in the brief period of several critical years. And while CIA's budget requests are not excessive in view of the mission assigned CIA, they do by their very size imperil the

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to its leadership the right to approve a

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budget also defer to that leadership the right to

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Before examining these issues, one might justifiably ask: "How has the CIA budget gotten so big so quickly?".

The answer is revealing. Not only does it pose the problem but it also suggests a solution.

For while a small portion of this total increase is due to increased intelligence activity, the overwhelm-

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(\*) To be verified.
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except for the fact that this "cold war department"

must be conducted in secrecy with secret funds, it

bears little relationship to the basic intelligence

mission of CIA. Although conducted by OPC, a covert

division of CIA, these "cold war" activities are

directed by NSC after approval by PSB. And since PSB

is the child of State and Defense as well as CIA,

these "cold war" activities of OPC become the concern

of all three. CIA provides OPC its bed and board and

the respectability of parentage. In this instance,

however, parentage has become a costly role. Of the

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To avoid excessive scrutiny on this rising scale of expenditure, CIA can resort to one of two more convenient arrangements: (1) Either it can divide its budget into two parts, one for intelligence, another for the "cold war"

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<sup>(\*)</sup> To be verified.

and justify it on that basis in secret hearings; or

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(2) CIA can request that it be designated an agent of the armed forces for OPC undertakings, and insist that "cold war" funds and personnel be provided by

Defense.

Either alternative is pregnant with danger to the security of covert operations. But one or the other may be preferable to the trouble that may come with a

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